

From Political to Bureaucratic Will: Expounding the Power of Organizational Context in Shaping the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Measures in Africa

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1. Introduction

The quest to reduce corruption has become a universally acknowledged goal of policy-makers and public alike across a bewildering array of environments, including authoritarian and democratic, wealthy and impoverished, and politically stable and all-but-failed ones. The creation of organizations, laws, and policies have all centered on combating corruption, leading to the international adoption of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption by the General Assembly in 2003. Over the past ten years, domestic anti-corruption legislation has likely been spurred by rising social demand in the majority of countries around the world.¹ Despite this spell of activity, it is not astonishing that many anti-corruption initiatives fail to achieve their objectives. Anti-corruption institutions can seem hopelessly ‘outgunned’ in an uneven fight against systemically corrupt institutions. For every high-profile success story, there are dozens of spectacular failures or efforts that would appear to be on the fast track to nowhere. What then determines whether anti-corruption reforms succeed or fail? There are several levels at which one can search for an answer. Much explanation identifies ‘political will’ as a decisive factor,² generally denoting robust consensus on action among political elites. But as an explanatory category it has an elusive quality. Institutional interests even among elites are always fragmented, and never more so than when changes in the institutional rules of the game affect resource accumulation strategies. Political will can thus often be a front for what amounts to a symbolic or ‘ideological’ goal.³ For simplicity purposes, this article adopts the commonly known and used definition of corruption to mean ‘any act of using official powers for private gains’.

From the institutionalist perspective, this article explains the power of organizational context in shaping the implementation of anti-corruption measures in the public sectors. It posits that, despite a myriad of literature to support the importance of political will in combating corruption; political will alone cannot warrant success in the fight against corruption; if the bureaucrats themselves are unwilling to support the national anti corruption efforts. It asserts that the bureaucrats who are expected to passionately adopt and implement anti corruption measures, lack genuine commitment to effectively implement anti corruption measures. It further argues that, over the last three decades, the experience has proved that, ‘political will’ has become a redundant idiom frequently used as an excuse by the bureaucrats to justify their unwillingness to implement anti corruption measures. The article is composed of six parts. The first part covers an introduction. Part two discusses the power (influence) of organizational context in shaping the implementation of anti corruption measures including a few examples from the developing economies akin to Tanzania. Part three discusses the reasons for increased bureaucratic corruption in Africa. Part four discusses the importance of institutions. Part five examines the

¹ Transparency International. Global Corruption Report (2004)

² Brinkerhoff, D.W. ‘Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts: An Analytical Framework’. Public Administration and Development 20 (3): 239-252 (2000)

³ Quick, S. ‘the Paradox of Popularity: ‘Ideological’ Program Implementation in Zambia’. In Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World, ed., M. Grindle. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (1980)

efficacy of the current anti corruption measures in curbing corruption. Part six offers some concluding remarks and one major policy option for curbing bureaucratic corruption.

2. Power of Context in Shaping the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Policies

In Africa, oftentimes the bureaucrats attempt to increase their level of compensation by lobbying lawmakers and politicians and by engaging in other activities to influence the political system and maximize benefits accruing to them. Many civil servants also illegally increase their compensation by providing services to interest groups that seek favors from the government. Political coalitions seeking ways to subvert the existing rules to redistribute national income and wealth in their favor can achieve their objectives by bribing civil servants whose job is to enforce state regulations and implement national development plans. Bureaucrats may give more consideration to the demands of such interest groups than to the proper enforcement of state laws and regulations and the efficient implementation of national development plans if they learn that providing services to groups seeking state favors can pay off financially better than their regular (public) jobs. In societies where civil service compensation levels are relatively low, a significant part of the public employee's total compensation may be derived from engagement in outside activities, resulting in a significant increase in bureaucratic corruption.⁴ This also explains why some senior state officials would like to associate with the rich business people.

The rules that regulate socio-political relations in a country have a significant impact on the ability of civil servants to seek and secure (either legally or illegally) outside income. In nondemocratic societies, as has been shown by⁵ bureaucrats are less constrained in their employment of public resources to lobby legislators and influence those individuals with direct responsibility for determining levels of compensation for the public sect. In fact, most public workers in many African nations are part of the political elites and have a substantial impact on how resources are allocated. Under these conditions, civil servants behave like interest groups whose primary objective is to put pressure on the political system in an effort to redistribute wealth to elites. Opportunistic behavior, especially rent-seeking, is typically quite prevalent in nations with poorly designed, ineffective, and non-self-enforcing constitutional laws. The laws that control socio-political interaction in these nations have not been effective at reining in the government.

In countries with poorly constructed, inefficient, and non self-enforcing constitutional rules, opportunistic behavior (including rent seeking) is usually quite pervasive. In such countries, the rules that regulate socio-political interaction, have failed to adequately constrain the government. As a result, state intervention in private exchange is equally subtle. Excessive regulation of economic activities creates many opportunities for rent seeking, including bureaucratic corruption. Bureaucratic corruption provides civil servants with the opportunity to raise their compensation above what the law prescribes. Through the practice of corruption, private entrepreneurs are able to capture and maintain monopoly positions in the economy. Politicians, who serve as wealth brokers, obtain the resources they need to purchase security and continue to monopolize the supply of legislation. The biggest loser from corruption is society as a whole. Corruption is harmful as it allows inefficient producers to remain in business, encourages

⁴ Mbaku, J.M. 'Military Expenditures and Bureaucratic Competition for Rents' Public Choice (1991a)

⁵ Kimenyi, M.S. 'Bureaucratic Rents and Political Institutions. 'Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice (1987)

governments to pursue perverse economic policies, and provides opportunities to bureaucrats and politicians to enrich themselves through extorting bribes from those seeking government favors. Thus, corruption distorts economic incentives, discourages free enterprise, and slows economic growth.⁶

In examining bureaucratic corruption in Africa, it is important to discuss the supply side. Unless entrepreneurs and groups seeking government favors supply the bribes, then most bureaucratic corruption would be limited to nepotism, illegal levies, and the illegal appropriation of public resources. In African context, payments from entrepreneurs seeking state favors represent an important source of extra-legal income for bureaucrats. A society's laws and institutions have a significant impact on the level of bureaucratic corruption. State-imposed expenses imposed by regulatory programs can be quite onerous on businesses and entrepreneurship, which motivates investors to look for ways to reduce them. Of course, the majority of intervention strategies produce rents, which are often sought for through a political process. Bribing government employees has been a crucial strategy for vying for those rents. Bureaucratic corruption can be seen as a survival tactic for profit-maximizing businesses confronted with upsetting state laws.⁷

The above account clearly indicates that it is not, as many social science researchers would want us to believe that, political will is the ideal 'magic bullet' for curbing public sector corruption. Actually, the bureaucrats whose major role, among others, is to advise policy makers on how best to stop corrupt practices, have turned to be the 'perpetrators' of the corrupt practices. Even where anti corruption policies, rules and regulations are so clear and the politicians have demonstrated real support to anti corruption crusade, bureaucrats fail to demonstrate genuine commitment to implement the adopted anti corruption measures in many African countries. It is therefore fairly concluded that, it not the problem of policy makers (i.e. politicians though they partly share the blame) but it is actually the problem of technocrats entrusted to run public institutions. We turn to a discussion of causes for bureaucratic corruption in African countries.

3. Why Bureaucratic Corruption is rampant in Africa?

Much research has been done to determine the causes of bureaucratic corruption in Africa. According to,⁸ African civil servants may be obliged to share the proceeds of their public offices with their kinfolk. The civil servant is under intense pressure from his extended African family, which drives him to use unscrupulous methods. It is thought that bureaucrats take advantage of their public positions to gain advantages for themselves, their families, and their ethnic or social groups. Researchers have so tended to emphasize the institutional and personal factors that contribute to corrupt behavior when investigating corruption in Africa. The civil worker is forced to utilize dishonest tactics by the overwhelming pressure of his extended African family. It is believed that bureaucrats exploit their public positions to benefit their families, ethnic or social groups, and themselves. When examining corruption in Africa, researchers have a tendency to

⁶ Mbaku, J.M. 'Military Expenditures and Bureaucratic Competition for Rents' Public Choice (1991a)

⁷ Harch, E. 'Accumulators and Democrats: Challenging State Corruption in Africa.' Journal of Modern African Studies (1993)

⁸ Apter, D.E. Ghana in Transition. New York: Antheneum (1963)

stress the institutional and individual variables that contribute to corrupt behavior'.⁹ Numerous studies have claimed that excessive levels of bureaucratic corruption in these economies are connected to the inhabitants of many developing countries' seeming lack of commitment to serving the public good. Employees in the civil service in many African nations view public service as a chance for personal growth. For example, all political coalitions and organizations in post-independence Nigeria have been documented as making serious attempts to seize control of the state apparatus in order to use the state's wealth-redistribution powers for personal gain.¹⁰ Immediately after seizing power, governments typically erects formidable obstacles to entry and monopolizes the production of legislation, ensuring that other parties do not participate in the distribution of resources. In order for locked-out groups to participate in the economic systems, bribes must be paid to the in charge officials, who are all members of the politically dominant group. Nigeria is not the only nation in Africa where the government's machinery has been turned into a tool for the elitism of the politically powerful clique. South Africa, long regarded by many scholars in the West as a stronghold for free enterprise in Africa, has for many years promoted laws that allowed the white minority to use the redistributive powers of the state to enrich itself while sentencing the black majority to perpetual poverty and deprivation.¹¹ Politicians and bureaucrats all over Africa, from Algeria to Zaire, advocate unfavorable economic policies that, while impoverishing the majority of population, offer concentrated and sizable benefits to the national elites and interest groups. Incompetence and inefficiency among civil servants have been given as other institutional issues associated with bureaucratic corruption in Africa. Sustainable economic and social development requires an efficient and professional civil service. The regime bureaucracy must be receptive to the demands of the entrepreneurial class in order to efficiently implement national development programs and foster entrepreneurship and innovation in the economy.

To effectively carry out national development plans and promote entrepreneurship and innovation in the economy, the government bureaucracy must be responsive to the needs of the entrepreneurial class. Additionally, public goods and services should be delivered efficiently. The inference is that a high level of professionalism and competence are required of the country's civil service. Senior positions should only be given to individuals who have distinguished themselves and have the capacity and experience to effectively carry out the activities allocated to them. Hiring decisions should be based on merit and qualification. Positions in the civil service shouldn't be given in exchange for political favors, exchanged for bribes, or used to fulfill responsibilities to one's ethnic group. Incompetent, unqualified, and unprofessional civil servants contribute significantly to failures in development and force the country to remain essentially underdeveloped. Many African nations embraced statism as their preferred development strategy soon after gaining independence. This method of resource distribution placed a focus on state control and led to the transformation of numerous African governments into powerful economic entities. The majority of investors, exporters, importers, and bankers today are African governments. Additionally, the state is heavily involved in income redistribution and employs a substantial share of the nation's labor force. Through a series of regulations and statutes, the state

⁹ Gould. *Bureaucratic Corruption Underdevelopment in the Third World: The Case of Zaire*. New York: Pergamon Press (1980)

¹⁰ Mbaku, J.M. 'Military Expenditures and Bureaucratic Competition for Rents' *Public Choice* (1991a)

¹¹ Alam, M.S. 'Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy of Underdevelopment.' *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 48(4): 441-56 (1989)

is able to extract wealth from the poorly organized rural farm sector for use in subsidizing the relatively well-organized and politically volatile urban sector. Public personnel whose duty is to implement the laws have benefited from excessive governmental intervention in private transaction in several African countries. Government restrictions have been used by bureaucrats to benefit themselves at the expense of the rest of society because they control a vast quantity of public resources. Bureaucrats have frequently created shortages to pressure potential demanders into paying bribes. Laws and regulations are generally badly, capriciously, ineffectively, and arbitrarily enforced in African countries. As a result, those who are harmed by the regulations must practice opportunism, including paying bribes to government officials. According to numerous academics, one of the major causes of corruption in post-independence Africa was the transformation of the state infrastructure into a tool for the enrichment of the politically dominant group. Significant inequality in the allocation of resources, significant levels of material deprivation and pervasive and chronic poverty have all been identified as key contributors to corruption in African nations.¹² Many regions of the world have made significant advancements in economic and human development during the past 40 years. Yet, Africa has remained essentially poor and severely deprived. Evidence shows that Africa is today the poorest region of the world. The post-independence period saw the development of the African military as a significant player in resource allocation, which has further affected income distribution. The budget for the armed forces is disproportionately large in many African nations. Numerous experts contend that these post-independence trends have considerably aided in the growth of corruption, underdevelopment, and widespread poverty and misery. Some academics think that corrupt cultural norms and practices are what cause corruption in Africa and other emerging nations.¹³ Other researchers believe that corruption in Africa is related to the clash between traditional and foreign norms that accompany modernization and industrial development. As such, corruption is seen as an unavoidable consequence of economic modernization and political development. In the majority of developing societies, individual rights are often subordinate to the rights of the group or social cleavage. As a result, loyalty to the ethnic group is considered more important than individual rights or personal accountability. In Africa, these particularistic attachments are quite strong and have been cited as important determinants of bureaucratic corruption. Individuals who become successful in the public sector or the exchange economy are expected to share the benefits with their extended family and their ethnic cleavage. Thus, a civil servant may engage in corrupt activities in an effort to meet personal obligations to members of his family or ethnic group. Public choice theory, on the other hand, argues that governmental oversight and regulation of economic activity are the main causes of bureaucratic corruption. Political coalitions will attempt to use the government to redistribute income and wealth in their favor after constitutional rules has been chosen, ratified, and a government has been constituted. Rent seeking will spread as organizations look for methods to benefit themselves at the expense of the rest of society unless the laws imposed successfully limit the government's power to provide special-interest legislation. At the same time, civil servants will be able to extort bribes from entrepreneurs seeking ways to minimize the burden of state regulations on their enterprises and attempting to enter economic sectors closed by state intervention in markets.

¹² Leys, C. 'What is the Problem About Corruption'? (1965)

¹³ Jabbara, J.G. 'Bureaucratic Corruption in the Third World: Causes and Remedies' *Indian Journal of Public Administration* 22: (1976)

The majority of Africans live in civilizations with weak, ineffective, and poorly crafted constitutional laws that give the government virtually unrestricted authority to interfere in private transactions. Such economies completely politicize resource distribution, and the civil service now serves as the main tool for resource distribution in place of the market. Civil employees are aware that valuable monopoly rights produced by regulatory actions of the government generate significant monopoly profits for their owners. As a result, authorities try to extort bribes from business owners in order to collect rent. Entrepreneurs can reduce costs when government regulations place a heavy burden on their company by offering bribes to law enforcement officials. It is anticipated that the bribe will either have the business exempt from the laws or result in a lower tax rate for the person's enterprise. Bureaucrats wouldn't be able to demand bribes from business owners if these limits on economic activity were removed. Thus, bureaucratic corruption is primarily rent-seeking behavior, which is directly related to the level and extent of government activity in the economy. Below the importance of rules is explained.

4. The Importance of Institutions

Some institutionalist researchers such as¹⁴ argue that institutions (herein referred to as the generally accepted rules for governing public servants' behaviors and conduct) which regulate the activities of individuals within a society matter and are a major determinant of how individuals and organizations behave. Only within the framework of current regulations can the actions of officials and the business people who pay them be accurately evaluated. Therefore, any attempt to examine or comprehend corruption inside a society would be fruitless without a thorough comprehension of that nation's laws and structures. It also means that any anti-corruption program that is created without considering how current laws affect how people behave in society, including bureaucrats, business people, voters, and politicians, will be futile. Rules define how individuals can interact with each other, provide a means for the settlement of conflict, and generally place constraints on individual behavior, as well as that of the group and collectivity.

Effective rules allow individuals to pursue their private ends in such a way that they do not infringe on the ability of others to do the same. The rules that regulate socio-political interaction can be explicit (e. g., a written constitution) or based on custom and tradition. Corruption can be seen as an opportunistic action on the part of people or groups given an existing system of norms. In this light, it is possible to view corruption as a problem of constitutional upkeep that can only be adequately resolved through comprehensive and game-changing rule revision.

In an attempt to highlight the importance of institutional norms and rules for controlling the conduct and behaviors of bureaucrats, researchers¹⁵ have occasionally opted to explain the relevance of rules by using the 'tragedy of the commons,' an illustration that is used quite often in economics. If, for example, the rules of a society require that agricultural land be owned communally, and farmers are assumed to be utility maximizers in the traditional sense, then

¹⁴ Brennan, G., and Buchanan, J.M. *The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press (1985)

¹⁵ Brennan, G., and Buchanan, J.M. *The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press (1985)

overgrazing will be the outcome. As opposed to what is frequently believed, overgrazing is an issue related to the nature of the laws that govern socio-political interactions in this society, including the actions of farmers. In other words, utility maximization will result in overgrazing under the current restrictions. As in many African communities, policing is typically used as a strategy to reduce the issue of overgrazing. Unfortunately, attempts to impose particular results within the current set of laws are rarely successful due to either insufficient accountability mechanisms or utility maximization, among other reasons, in the absence of privatization and appropriate institutions to safeguard and enforce property rights.

Africa's current anti-corruption initiatives face a number of challenges. First of all, they are being implemented within unworkable and ineffective rules. The second aspect of anti-corruption operations is policing, which aims to influence outcomes while adhering to the law. Third, the counteracting institutions tasked with policing and enforcing the rules and the bureaucrats who work in those agencies are not appropriately limited by the laws. This is in addition to poor accountability systems and a culture of 'protectionism'. Finally, a large number of bureaucrats are corrupt themselves and cannot be trusted to offer the direction required to manage successful anti corruption initiatives. To ensure that the outcomes produced within the rules are those that society desires, effective corruption cleanup must thus start with rule reform. If the laws that govern socio-political interactions include an incentive structure that makes opportunism extremely profitable, efforts to eradicate corruption would be ineffective. If, as a result of the adopted rules, rent-seeking activities, as opposed to genuine entrepreneurship, are highly rewarding, entrepreneurs are likely to devote most of their time and effort to rent seeking. In such a case, using the police force to prevent individuals from taking advantage of lucrative rent seeking opportunities is unlikely to be effective, especially if members of the police are corrupt and inefficient. Again, the fundamental problem is the absence of a rule of law, not the corrupt outcomes. Thus, appropriate procedures for effective control of rent seeking and other opportunistic behaviors, including bureaucratic corruption, is to reform the rules of the game and change the incentive system. According to public choice theory, combating corruption and other opportunistic actions is a challenge of maintaining the constitution or regulations. Opportunistic behavior also includes shirking, unfair selection, moral hazard, and free riding in addition to corruption.¹⁶ Even if individuals select an efficient set of rules (i. e., rules that generate mutual gains for all parties), opportunistic behavior (including corruption) would still be a problem for the post-constitutional society. Making certain that opportunism is minimized in the post-contractual society requires an efficient and effective enforcement system to ensure cooperation and compliance. Unfortunately, third-party enforcement of constitutional rules is usually unreliable, inefficient, and not particularly workable. Some academics have even advocated allowing the national judiciary and police to work as opposing forces to ensure compliance and reduce opportunism. However, those organizations are also subject to pressure from interest groups. Additionally, those institutions lack adequate legal restraint and are heavily corrupted in the majority of African nations. Consequently, the national judiciary and police are not appropriate instruments for curbing corruption or enforcing the constitutional rules.¹⁷

¹⁶ Ostrom, E.; Schroeder, L.; and Wynne, S. *Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective*. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press (1993)

¹⁷Lowenberg, A.D. 'A Post-Apartheid Constitution for South Africa: Lessons from Public Choice.' *Cato Journal* 12(2): 297-319 (1992)

The problem of rule maintenance has been examined by several researchers. Emerging from these studies is a theory of constitutional maintenance whose main objective is to find ways to minimize opportunism in the post-constitutional society.¹⁸ It is generally believed that making the constitution or set of rules self-enforcing will eliminate most opportunities for rent seeking and other opportunistic behavior. A constitution can be made self-enforcing by endowing it with principles and procedural rules that introduce, maintain, and enhance political and economic competition in the post-constitutional society. In other words, during constitutional negotiations, the rules are designed to make both political and economic markets competitive and accessible to all members of society. An important characteristic of a self-enforcing set of rules is its ability to constrain government and limit the exercise of government agency. If the state's ability to intervene in private exchange is constitutionally restrained, political coalitions will find it very difficult to engage in inefficient redistributions. Constitutionally, constraining the ability of the government to engage in ex-post resource redistributions will significantly limit redistributions of income induced by majority vote and rent seeking. Once the constitution limits the ability of the state to redistribute income and wealth, interest groups are unlikely to invest in rent seeking, because such investments would either yield meager returns or be unprofitable and in so doing curbing corrupt behaviors.

5. How Effective are the extant Anti –Corruption Reforms in Africa?

Today's constitutional laws govern the majority of independent African nations. Nonetheless, most African countries have failed to create proper laws and institutions, especially those that would ensure the kinds of outcomes wanted by members of society, in spite of numerous attempts at post-independence rule reform. Many African countries have adopted constitutions that are essentially copies of European constitutional models, which have allowed the politically dominant parties to continue to hold a monopoly on power especially in African countries.

The institutions brought to the African colonies by the Europeans were primarily ‘structures of exploitation, despotism, and degradation.’¹⁹ As argued,²⁰ ‘the colonial state was conceived in violence rather than by negotiation.’ Thus, the rules established to regulate socio-political relations in the African colonies were not the outcome of negotiations among representatives of relevant population groups in those societies. Instead, those rules were imposed by Europeans and designed to satisfy their desired outcomes. The colonialists swiftly created a reform program as it became clear that the colonies would be granted independence, but it was unable to properly address the fundamental problems related to the meaningful participation of the indigenous people in post-independence development. This is why some academics think that these last-minute reform initiatives fell short of enabling a fundamental change in the fields of economics, culture, or bureaucracy.²¹ Thus, the Europeans left behind rules and institutions that were weak and potentially wobbly. The rules, rather than controlling corruption, they actually facilitate it.

¹⁸ Anderson, T.L. , and Hill, P.J. ‘Constraining the Transfer Society: Constitutional and Moral Dimensions.’ *Cato Journal* 6(1): 317-39 (1986)

¹⁹ Fatton, R. Jr. ‘Liberal Democracy in Africa.’ *Political Science Quarterly* 105(3): 455-73 (1990)

²⁰ Etzioni-Halevy, W. *Political Manipulation and Administrative Power*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul (1979)

²¹ Fatton, R. Jr. ‘Liberal Democracy in Africa.’ *Political Science Quarterly* 105(3): 455-73 (1990)

Most of the constitutional rules that African countries adopted at independence were developed abroad with the interests of the indigenous people represented by urban elites, most of them had been educated in Europe and had accepted Western political norms and beliefs. In addition to the fact that these urban elites were not well informed on conditions in the rural sectors of their countries, they usually had objectives and interests that were significantly different from those of their peasant countrymen. Since the design of rules often excluded a significant part of national political opinion, the documents adopted were thus not efficient.

Many African countries later abandoned the rules that they had adopted at independence and undertook constitutional reforms in an effort to design more efficient and appropriate rules. Unfortunately, a sizable portion of the country's political opinion was shut out of the constitutional discourse, which was still restricted to a small group of urban elites. In some nations, the constitution was suspended and government was established by military order. In reality, a number of African countries, like Ghana, the former Zaire, Nigeria, Libya, and Somalia, have spent most of their time as independent states under the control of military elites.

In addition to the fact that constitutional discourse was dominated by urban elites, the process did not seriously consider the aspirations, desires, and needs of the rural populations, and the people were not enfranchised and provided the facilities to participate effectively in the selection of rules. For example, in South Africa (until 1994), participation in rules selection was limited to whites.²² The constitutional rules produced by post-independence efforts produced Leviathan states, whose redistributive powers were used by political coalitions to amass wealth for themselves while impoverishing the rest of the people. Today, a large portion of the population of Africa abides by laws that were not unanimously adopted by the relevant demographic groups within each nation or by their representatives. Agreement must be reached willingly and must be unanimous in order to produce an effective set of rules. Due to the aforementioned and the fact that post-independence attempts at constitutional reform largely failed to result in more effective constitutions, bureaucratic corruption levels have awfully increased over the last three decades.

6. Concluding Remarks

The purpose of this paper was to examine the power of organizational context in shaping the implementation of anti corruption measures in public institutions. African countries, like many developing countries, have tried several strategies in an effort to minimize levels of bureaucratic corruption. These include societal, legal, market, and political strategies. All those approaches to curbing corruption represent the manipulation of outcomes within a given set of rules and presuppose the existence of efficient counteracting institutions. The evidence has shown, however, that most judiciary systems and police forces in African countries are not properly constrained by the law and that most civil servants including judges and police officers are themselves corrupt. As a result, most anti corruption programs [despite being technically good and well-crafted] have proved to be futile. Bureaucratic corruption is thus an outcome generated within a given set of rules. In other words, success or failure of the anti corruption measures depends largely on the organizational context in which the rules are implemented. It is also important to note that an effective evaluation of such an outcome can only be undertaken after a

²² Cowen, D.V. *The Foundations of Freedom: With Special Reference to Southern Africa*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press (1961).

thorough understanding of the rules that generate the outcome. Thus, to understand why bureaucrats engage in corruption requires an examination of the rules that regulate the socio-political behavior of individuals. Much as these rules determine how individuals behave and relate to each other, they also determine the outcomes to be generated in society. Thus, effective combating and prevention of corruption should not involve efforts to manipulate outcomes within rules. Instead, an effective approach should involve reforming the existing rules and the subsequent selection and adoption of new rules that can generate the outcomes desired by the society. It is fairly deduced that, despite a myriad of literature to support the importance of political will in combating corruption; political will is admittedly a necessary condition but not sufficient to warrant success in the fight against corruption, more so in developing countries. On the contrary, public bureaucrats expected to adopt and properly implement policies for curbing corruption; often lack genuine commitment to effectively implement anti corruption measures for private gains. In many occasions, the 'political will thesis' has been used as an excuse by the bureaucrats to justify their reluctance to well implement anti corruption policies. One policy option this article offers is that, there is a need to move from the popularly sang song of 'political will' to a more genuine 'bureaucratic will', if corruption is to be controlled in public institutions.

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